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Philosophy of Law
Editor's note: This is the first part of a two-part series, which in turn is part of a larger work still in
progress.
BY THEIR OWN admission in the Iran-Contra hearings, Reagan administration officials, members of the
executive branch, had made statements (sometimes under oath) to Congress shrewdly calculated to evade
the legislative inquiry and mislead the inquirer. Yet, with a few exceptions, each of these misleading
statements, taken alone, was literally true. Does such a strategy undermine the constitutional scheme of
shared powers and checks and balances envisioned by the founders? Or does an emergency, that may
justify a covert operation in support of American foreign policy also permit executive evasion of
legislative oversight?
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On Nov. 25, 1986, while briefing the Senate Intelligence Committee, Asst. Secretary of State Elliott
Abrams was asked -- so we have the record clear -- whether he had any knowledge or indication that the
Contras were receiving funds from Israeli or other Mideastern sources?
No, he replied, despite recently having solicited $10 million from the Sultan of Brunei.1 He later defended
that denial as truth: Brunei, although a mostly Moslem, oil-producing country, is located on the South
China Sea.
Your approach on November 25, before the Senate Intelligence Committee, was that unless the senators
asked you exactly the right question, using exactly the right words, they weren't going to get the right
answers. Wasn't that the approach? challenged Mark Belnick, assistant Senate counsel of the joint HouseSenate committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair.
That is exactly the correct description of what I did on that date,' Mr. Abrams readily conceded.
Therefore you could give this literally correct answer, despite the existence of the Brunei solicitation?
Literally correct and perhaps misleading.2
I did not authorize him to make false statements. I did think he would withhold information and be
evasive frankly in answering questions. My objective all along was to withhold from the Congress exactly
what the [National Security Council] staff was doing in carrying out the President's policy....As I've said
before, I did not expect him to lie to the committee. I expected him to be evasive....[W]ith his
resourcefulness, I thought he could handle it.3
The man sent to the Hill to dodge the Congress was Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, The speaker here, his boss,
Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, throughout the hearings, perhaps alone, steadfastly insisted that in this
complex and dangerous world, shrewdly evading and misleading Congress was sometimes necessary and
proper, but in any case it was not lying.
In letters drafted by Lt. Col. North, National Security Advisers Poindexter and Robert C. McFarlane had
assured Congress that the National Security Council staff was complying with the letter and spirit of the
Boland amendment. As enacted by Congress, the Boland amendment required that no funds available to
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the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United
States Government involved in intelligence activity may be obligated or expended for the purpose of or
which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua by any nation, group or organization, movement or individual.4
Mr. McFarlane expressed his regret about his written assurances, but Rear Adm. Poindexter and Lt. Col.
North defended them as true: Insofar as the Boland admendment (as they interpreted it) in no way applied
to the National Security Council staff, they could not possibly have violated it.
Admiral, in saying that you are complying with the letter and spirit of law, when you mean that the law
doesn't apply and that you are supporting the Contras, you do not consider that to be misleading
Congress? demanded Arthur L. Liman, chief counsel to the Senate's Iran-Contra committee.
We did not -- I have not said that we weren't helping the contras. We were clearly helping the contras.5
Armed with literal truth, Rear Adm. Poindexter could claim he had complied with the Boland amendment
and Elliott Abrams could insist he truly knew of no solicitation of a Middle Eastern country.
Can these truths also be lies? Can they be perjury?
RICHARD V. Secord's Lake Resources account, used to channel funds to the Contras, was hardly the first
secret Swiss bank account later to become the object of a probe. Years before, in the course of a
bankruptcy proceeding, bankrupt movie mogul Samuel Bronston too was questioned about his bank
accounts:
Q: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have you ever?
A: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
The company did have a Swiss bank account. But so, too, did Mr. Bronston have a personal Swiss bank
account that he obscured from his creditors by his intentionally misleading reply. When, Mr. Bronston,
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under oath, successfully diverted attention by creating an illusion with a literally truthful statement -- the
company did -- had he lied?
The government prosecuted Mr. Bronston for perjury on the theory that in order to mislead his questioner
he had unresponsively addressed his answer to the company's assets and not to his own -- thereby
implying that he had no personal Swiss bank account at the relevant time.6 The trial judge had instructed
the jury that the basic issue was whether Mr. Bronston spoke his true belief, and that he could be
convicted for an answer not literally false but when considered in the context in which it was given,
neverthless constituted a false statement.
The majority of a divided 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed Mr. Bronston's conviction,
saw the question as whether an answer under oath, which is true -- but only half true -- can constitute
perjury? Mr. Bronston's nonresponsive answer very clearly indicated his comprehension of what was
called for by the question, said Circuit Judge James L. Oakes, for the majority. An answer containing half
of the truth which also constitutes a lie by negative implication, when the answer is intentionally given
in place of the responsive answer called for by a proper question is perjury. This must be so especially in
the context of a [bankruptcy] examination which by its nature is a searching expedition, where the
witnesses are the only parties who know the truth and are able to divulge it.7
For the trial and appellate courts in Bronston v. U.S., lies include statements that individually correspond
to reality but taken together in context present a false, misleading and deceptive portrait.
By this coherence view of truth, no single statement is true in isolation. We get at one truth only through
the rest of truth,8 A statement is true insofar as it implies and is implied by other statements that are true.
Truth is a matter of degree. Some statements are partly true or mostly true. Half-truths are also half false.
By this coherence view, in the context of the inquiries, Mr. Abrams, Rear Adm. Poindexter and Mr.
Bronston had lied.
As Judge Oakes said, affirming Mr. Bronston's conviction:
A half-truth containing a lie, interjected by a knowledgeable and interested witness, may result in sidetracking the person inquiring or it may persuade the interrogator to proceed on another line of questioning.
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Either consequence is contrary to the whole truth principle of the oath. The question here was not from
out of the blue or on a collateral matter. The examination was for the very purpose known to the appellant
-- of elicitng the kind of information this question called for.9
THE U.S. SUPREME Court, however, saw truth differently. Granting certiorari to consider a narrow but
important question, [i.e.,]...whether a witness may be convicted of perjury for an answer under oath that is
literally true but not responsive to the question asked and arguably misleading by negative implication, the
court found Mr. Bronston's answers not guileless but also not perjurious. It is the responsibility of the
lawyer to probe; testimonial interrogation, and cross-examination in particular, is a probing, prying,
pressing form of inquiry, the high court reasoned. If a witness evades, it is the lawyer's responsibility to
recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools
of adversary examination. The perjury statute was not to be invoked simply because a wily witness
succeeds in derailing the questioner -- so long as the witness speaks the literal truth.10
In reversing Mr. Bronston's perjury conviction, the Supreme Court had embraced literal truth. So had Mr.
Abrams and Rear Adm. Poindexter; so too had Aristotle, who followed Plato's definition: To say of what
is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not, is true.11 Combatting the sophists' view that it is impossible to
speak falsely, because what is not, cannot be uttered, Plato and Artistotle held truth to consist in the
correspondence of a statement with the things that are or the facts. How they correspond is not fully
explained.12
For Bertrand Russell, too, truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact.13 In his
essay, On the Nature of Truth, Mr. Pussell observes that a statement is true when a person who believes it
believes truly, and false when a person who believes it believes falsely.14 By this view, when Mr. Abrams
denies there was a contribution from a Middle Eastern country he believes truly, because no Middle
Eastern county had contributed that is, Brunei is not a Middle Eastern county. Furthermore, at the moment
he testified, the money had not yet been received.
But for Sen. Bill Bradley, D-N.J., who asked the question, and for other members of the Intelligence
Committee who heard his reply, Mr. Abrams' statement is correspondently false insofar as they
(mis)understand it to assert that no money was solicited from countries that they would hold to include
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Brunei. Mr. Russell does not clearly address a statement's truth for the speaker and simultaneous falsity
for a listener under a correspondence view. Of course, by a coherence point of view, Mr. Abrams' halftruth was also half-false. It failed to cohere with other true statements: it was false in context. But for
Aristotle and other correspondence advocates, a statement is either true or false, but never both.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in Bronston, had sent a message.
However calculated to mislead or deceive, an evasive but literally true statementa statement that
corresponds to reality -- cannot be perjury. The responsibility of a lawyer in an adversary setting is to
prove and press on, forcing the witness either to reveal the fact at issue or make a literally false statement
under oath and later be subject to a perjury prosecution.
But, as Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, D-Ind., pointedly reminded Asst. Secretary of State Abrams, when
exercising its oversight function in the conduct of foreign policy. Congress is a partner, not an adversary.
The object here is not to avoid a perjury indictment. The object is not to work to make your answer
literally correct but nonetheless misleading. The object is to make the Constitution of the United States
work.15
What standard of truth allows the Constitution to work? American pragmatists expound a theory of truth
that focuses on a statement's practical consequences. True statements are those that place us in working
touch with reality. All that the pragmatic method implies, said William James, is that truths should have
practical consequences. The pragmatist posits a reality and a mind with ideas. What now, he asks can
make these [ideas] true of that reality? Whereas others may content themselves with the vague statement
that the ideas must correspond or agree; the pragmatist insists on being more concrete, and asks what such
agreement may mean in detail. A pragmatist finds first that the ideas must point to or lead towards that
reality and no other, and then that the pointings and leadings must yield satisfaction as their result.16
SEVERAL YEARS before it decided that a misleading statement shrewdly calculated to evade an inquiry
could not be perjury as long as it corresponded to reality and was literally true, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected an advertisement that placed the viewing public in working touch with reality but was literally
false.
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In Colgate-Palmolive v. FTC,17 the TV commercial under consideration purported to show a hand
shaving sandpaper soaked in Rapid Shave. The cream could make sandpaper shaveable, but if shown on
television, sandpaper would appear like cardboard, so the ad agency had substituted plexiglass covered
with sand. The 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had supported the advertisement as an accurate portrayal
of the product's attributes. But the Supreme Court, in a decision by Chief Justice Earl Warren, reversed,
holding it false, misleading, and deceptive to claim to demonstrate something that did not literally
correspond to realityi.e., a hand shaving sandpaper.
The majority's literalist view, as Justice John M. Harlan pointed out in his dissent, would permit an
advertiser to exploit the fact that white shirts in a studio appear gray to a TV viewer, by demonstrating a
white shirt washed in a competitor's detergent, holding it up for the viewer to judge. That would be
literally true, but coherently falsefalse in context. It would be pragmatically false -- not placing the
shopper who relied on the demonstration in working touch with reality.
Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines a true copy pragmatically: it does not mean an absolutely exact
copy but means that the copy shall be so true that anybody can understand it.18
The white shirt shows a statement can be literally true yet false. The true copy shows a statement can be
literally false, yet true. Have you been to Grandma's recently? asks one sister, who has never visited. The
other, who has averaged visits twice a day for 10 days, responds: A million times in the past week. That
answer too, is literally false yet coherently pragmatically true.
If truth is literal, consisting of some form of correspondence between statement and fact, it is true that Mr.
Bronston's company did have a Swiss bank account; the United States did not solicit aid for the Contras
from a Middle Eastern country. The Boland amendment, if it couldn't be violated, obviously wasn't
violated. From a pragmatic perspective, however, neither Mr. Bronston's, Mr. Abrams' nor Rear Adm.
Poindexter's statements placed the recipients in working touch with reality.
Editor's note: Next week Mr. Blecker will conclude by evaluating the standard of truth necessary to
make the Constitution work.
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